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Introduction 
 
The employment rate in Hungary is very low in a regional and European comparison. The 
greatest problem under that heading is the employment of low educated persons, which 
reflects a rather negative picture2, while the long-term unemployment rate has also been on 
the rise over the past years (Messing 2012)3.  
 
The reason for low employment of those with low education goes back all the way to the regime 
change when a million and a half jobs were cut (part of which affected low educated people), and 
the Hungarian economy has not, up to the present day, been able to replace that loss, and no 
industries were created that could absorb the low educated surplus. Meanwhile, however, we see 
the second and third generation grow up in long-term unemployed families, while the 
school system, which should ensure the mobility of those with low education, is increasingly 
selective and segregative toward low-status people. After the regime change ‘the worst possible 
policy was implemented involving rapid elimination of jobs with relatively high unemployment 
benefit, and low employment/employability support (Köllő 2010). All these combined lead to the 
‘myth of over-subsidisation’, which suggests that unemployment benefit is enough to live idly. 
That is a misconception for several reasons including that the sum of the benefit must not exceed 
the applicable minimum wage, and that the problem is not the excessive benefit, but the fact that 
the wages one could earn through decent work are too low (Virág 2009). 
 
Successive governments have been capitalising on that myth since the early 2000s, which 
eventually lead to an increasingly strict principle of workfare, i.e. ‘work for allowance’. Social as 
well as political support for workfare seems unbroken while both professional and international 
experience tends to prove that public work as a response to the employment problems of the 
low educated is a dead-end. It uses up funding that could be used for job creation, and other 
(more effective) active labour market measures (84% of all such expenditure is spent on financing 
public work), while those involved in public work remain unable to transfer to the primary labour 
market, thus their chances clearly fail to improve, and they soon add to the long-term 
unemployment statistics (Köllő 2011, Bass 2011). Socially it is often stigmatising, and it often 
worsens working morals due to the humiliating nature of the work they have to do and due also 
to the fact that public workers do not enjoy a modicum of otherwise accepted employees’ rights. 
All that is compounded by the fact that the ratio of the Roma is high among allowance recipients, 
and thus also among those obliged to do public work (even if we do not have exact numbers), 
which further strengthens social support for the program given the fact that it is (also) meant to 
impose compliance on ‘idle gipsies’ (their stereotypical reference). 
 
Increasingly strict workfare type solutions began not with the introduction of the “Pathway to 
work” program but earlier, in 2009. That was the time when new legislation came into effect 
whereby working age regular social allowance recipients had to do public work (Csoba 
2010, Köllő 2011). Until 2009, however, only 10-15% of all allowance recipients were involved in 
the public work program (Köllő 2011), and the Pathway to work program launched by the 
socialist government took action to ratchet up participation rates: in the first year, the number 
of 2009 public work participants quadrupled (from 16 thousand to 63) (Csoba 2010: 23). It must 
be added that the principle of ‘work in exchange for allowance’ could not have been fully 
implemented in previous years only due to shortage of funding (Virág 2009). The following, 
conservative government carried on with the previous practice but applied stricter rules. 
                                                 
2 In 2010 the employment rate of those with only primary education: males 28%, females 24%; skilled workers: males 68%, 
females 56% (Messing 2013).  
3 For the literature used see the full, Hungarian version of the paper. 
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Public work was further expanded to reach planned figures of 165 thousand in 2010, and 203 
thousand in 2012 (Messing 2012). Stricter rules came with the Social Act of 2011, which 
requires a clear, even more powerful move in the direction of workfare. The new regulation says 
that if the person entitled to allowance fails to participate in public work or other registered 
employment for at least 30 days in the previous year, he/she loses entitlement to allowance, 
i.e. remains unsupported. Stricter rules also mean that while in the previous public work program 
the wages equalled the amount of the then applicable minimum pension, and they worked for six 
months, the new program lowered the monthly pay in public work to 47 thousand Forint 
(assuming 8 hours a day), while the allowance reduced, and the number of months in public work 
also significantly dropped for many, and 8 hours a day ceased to be guaranteed. 
 
Thus the current arrangement of public work may be regarded a classic workfare type policy much 
in line with its predecessors, with the clear aim of disciplining, and possibly punishing poor 
people (Virág 2009, Messing 2012). That policy satisfies a social need, which sees long-term 
unemployed people as a parasite, lazy part of the population willing to live on benefit (most of 
the time with an ethnic hue to the picture), and responds to the negative feelings of the 
‘working poor’, or other social groups working for minimum wage or hardly more, fearing 
marginalisation. 
 
In our paper we are going to investigate in three small communities of each of three counties 
(Borsod, Baranya and Pest)4 what local decisions have been made – in the area of public work, 
and local social benefits – in conjunction with changes in the Social Act resulting in the reduction 
of the social allowance, and making it conditional on performing public work, and what effects it 
has on the target population. First of all we were seeking an answer to how local governments 
react to this workfare type policy, i.e. what could be expected for the last few years, but the current 
regulation makes it perfectly obvious that the government’s objective was to force ‘idle allowance 
recipients’ back to work through any means including punishment. Observation from previous 
years have demonstrated that in many cases local governments failed to apply the punitive 
measures against the poor by e.g. turning a blind eye when somebody worked illegally, or even 
acknowledged the indispensable nature of illegal work by e.g. summoning them to public work in 
months other than the most intensive months of seasonal day labour or other casual work in the 
neighbourhood (Hamar 2010, Váradi 2010). It is a question to what extent the new, stricter 
public work regime can survive. Our paper aims to find out how much local governments 
regard public work and other forms of benefit a punitive tool, and, generally, what strategies 
they try to devise to handle local poverty, and how much they see the local poor, and 
unemployed, what explanations they have for poverty, and unemployment, and what steps result 
from the various assessments they come up with. 
 
 
 
2. Some typical features of local social policy 
 
2.1. Strategies of local governments to organise public work   
   
2.1.1. Interpreting the objective of public work  
 
Public work programs are implemented at a local level, and the manner of implementation, i.e. 
the preparation of public work applications, the selection of unemployed persons for public 
work, the creation of the selection criteria, involving other public employers, etc. all depend on 
                                                 
4 Borsod: C, B, D; Baranya: L, M, N; Pest: R, S, T communities. 
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the local governments. There is significant difference in the approach a particular local 
government takes toward public work, and what the general assessment of the aim of public 
work is in that community; it seems to be subject to local social conditions, and what image the 
local government, and specifically the mayor form about the poor, the Roma, and poverty. In 
general terms one can say that implementation takes place on a continuum between public work 
interpreted as an opportunity, and as a punishment / reward measure. 
 
Interpreting public work as an opportunity approaches the question from two aspects: it 
emphasises its positive effects firstly for the community, and secondly for the individual, or both 
in combination. It aims to exploit these effects. The individual benefit, which, in this case, is of 
course inseparable from the community’s benefit, is that the individual becomes motivated to 
work after being convinced of the value and utility of his/her work. 
 
The interpretation of public work as an opportunity was, as some see it, disabled by the public 
work program in 2010 when the new government took office. While prior to 2010 people could 
be made to work for the minimum wage for 6-8 hours a day, the new program sets the link 
between allowance and work as its main target while both the amount of the wage, and of the 
allowance continued to reduce. In other words: the current public work system has become a 
dead end, and is humiliating from both a macro and a micro point of view, it does not 
provide motivation, and all it does is help the manipulation of statistics. 
 
With its amount reduced, the current public work program practically fails to ensure any 
livelihood in any way, not even at the level where the previous minimum wage did, being equally 
low. At the same time it is compulsory as it is a criterion for staying in the benefit system. All 
these factors amount to the fact that public work will not have any motivating effect. 
 
In one community (T) they tried to use public work in a positive way so that motivation for work 
did not take the form of forced labour but a means of appreciation: ‘I require respect, they should also 
do the same, they should also require appreciation, and it changed the public view’ Public workers could feel 
that their work is being appreciated. However, the results achieved were fully zeroed by this new 
program. The mayor of this community saw a motivating potential in the previous public work 
program whereby he managed to shape the community’s morals, and individuals’ attitude. He 
essentially lost that tool with this new program, which, according to both those concerned, and 
himself, is humiliating to the extent where it no longer fulfils its stated objective of motivation to 
work. 
 
At the same time, however, one comes across views that find the current public work programs 
good and important. These are part of government communication (work based society, 
work for allowance), and, within that, ideological support of the punitive nature of public 
work. 
 
At B municipality they find that the most important element in forming their views on public 
work is that it enables people to work for their allowance rather than just ‘claiming’ it. The mayor 
of community C also has a favourable assessment concerning the public work program. As the 
number of places under this new program has reduced, the mayor has found it important to 
lobby wherever he could, to maximise the public work opportunities that the community can 
offer. 
 
The essential difference between the two mayors’ stories is that they have a different perception 
concerning the essence of public work. The mayor of community T believes that only meaningful 
work must be offered otherwise the whole program misses its aim, i.e. that participants should 
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really work for their allowance, while the mayor of community C thinks that people should work, 
but fails to emphasise that the point of working is to gain entitlement to the benefit. 
 
The method applied in community B is based on the exploitation of the punishment / reward 
dimension of the current public work program. They find it important to organise public work, 
and have therefore established a not-for-profit company (as one among many) with the aim of 
carrying on with their activities launched under the Start program. Part of the major organisation 
and reorganisation operation is that the local government designed a motivation-rewarding 
system. Those who can and are willing to work more and better, have the option of working 
more often and for longer periods, and even to become employed by the company. The basic 
principle is the same as adopted by the local government of community R in Pest county, i.e. of 
looking at public work as an opportunity that both the village and the individual may benefit 
from. An important difference, however, is that while community R, as far as we saw it, considers 
the current public work program unsuitable for realising these objectives exactly on account of its 
punitive and humiliating nature, community B believes that the public work program may achieve 
effectiveness, and lend prestige to the underlying activity exactly through establishing a system of 
punishments and rewards. The mayor of the community is definitely satisfied with the results 
because of its motivating power, i.e. that somebody can ultimately end up being employed at the 
company. ‘Because it had to be deserved. It worked. … we managed to lend prestige to this thing. So we 
managed to establish a system in which this public work program is not looked down on any more’ 
 
However, the interview revealed the fact that in addition to rewards, motivation is also achieved 
through legal and sometimes not so legal punishment. In other words, in line with current 
regulation, the local government uses its own tools to support, and reinforce the punitive 
character of public work derived from the ideology of the “work-based society”: when the 
allocation of local social allowances are being decided upon, the applicant’s rate of participation 
in, and attitude to public work is considered, and if found unsatisfactory, the application may 
even be refused. 
 
2.1.2. Selection for public work, the method of involvement. What basic principles apply?  
 
Many local governments aim at maximising participation in public work. As we could see above 
some communities lobby to enrol as many people as possible. They regard social sensitivity as 
the major consideration, mainly in the new system where, due to the lowered allowance it is not 
indifferent how long people can participate in the public work program. 
 
As different from the above, other local governments find that a place on the public work 
program must be deserved. As the mayor’s office has a limited budget to hire people, they 
must select from a pool. One of the most important selection criteria is to see who do and who 
do not want to work. With these local governments it is also an important aspect before 
involving somebody to see if he/she tries to defraud the system by by-passing the restriction of 
only one person is a family being entitled to employment substitute allowance, FHT, which also 
means that one per family can do public work. 
 
The mayor of that community underlines that the current system excludes social sensitivity as 
the maximum number of participants is given, and it falls short of the total number of applicants. 
 
2.1.3. The assessment of occasional or illegal work 
 
Local governments, and institutions have a specific but very important means to influence the 
lives of the local population, and that is even more so with people in poverty and  deep poverty, 
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who are most exposed. As our examples illustrate, there is a direct relationship between the 
general perception of the poor, and the measures taken by the local political élite. An important 
aspect among these measures is the way they relate to the letter of law, which is presently 
increasingly aimed at stigmatising poverty, and disciplining poor unemployed people. 
 
One significant aspect is that benefit recipients and public workers are not allowed to have 
another job (and must not work illegally), because that would result in loss of entitlement to 
benefits. While from a macroeconomic point of view it is a really important to minimise the 
black and the grey economy are, at the level of livelihood for families and individuals illegal 
work is a question of almost life and death. Families clearly cannot make a living on benefits, 
especially when they are as low as today, which has been the case for some years now (Virág 
2009, Bass 2010, Messing-Molnár 2011). Ever since the regime change the most destitute social 
groups have always relied on informal (or straight illegal) work for their livelihood. That is of 
course quite apparent, especially in a village where one can easily observe who goes where 
regularly, and who does what and when.  So it is an ever weightier issue how the local political 
élite wishes to relate to illegal work, or if it ignores it, aware that people would be unable to 
make ends meet without it, or decides to stick to the letter of law, refusing to tolerate ‘tricks’, and 
taking action, and excluding illegal or occasional workers from social allowance or from 
the public work program. 
 
Some local governments are outraged at the current regulation, and are reluctant to admit that 
quite a few people in their communities could be easily excluded from the list.  
 
Other local governments do the opposite, and try to screen out participants in the black 
economy. Their hands are more or less tied, so they are mostly left with the only instrument of 
people denouncing one another, and encouraging people to do that, and involving other 
authorities such as the field ranger in the same. 
 
2.1.4. Organising the 30 day voluntary public work  
 
Despite the very different strategies followed by local governments concerning public work, each 
local government has so far found the 30 day voluntary public work important to arrange. 
That observation differs from the finding in the 2012 ombudsman’s report5: ‘In my report I have 
stated that both in the communities being surveyed, and also on a countrywide scale there are a 
significant number of people in dire financial situations, who are still excluded from the provision 
system for non-fulfilment of the statutory entitlement criteria. In response to a query by the 
ombudsman, the secretary of state in charge of social, family, and youth issues disclosed 
information that in the first half of 2012 approximately 6000 working age unemployed persons’ 
entitlement had to be terminated for failure to complete the 30 day registered employment. (…) I 
was general experience in the course of the interviews that local governments did not feel that 
type of assistance to be their own specific responsibility. They regarded documenting 30-day’s 
‘activity’ exclusively the obligation of the recipient, and all they acknowledged to be their task was 
checking if the certificate concerning the 30 days was available.’  
 
In the communities surveyed the attitudes of local governments so far discussed played a less 
important role, and the 30-day employment was completed ensuring more or less reliably that 
nobody should drop out of the system. The interviews also reveal that even under local 
governments in staunch support of the ‘work in return for allowance’ principle only those few 
people dropped out of the system who – as they said – were impossible to involve in the activity 
                                                 
5 The report of the Ombudsman of fundamental rights in the case no. AJB-3025/2012.  
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for those 30 days. (We have no accurate information on whether the local government actually 
did everything in its power to involve the unwilling person(s)) 
 
The mayor of community D sees the absurdity of the situation himself, despite the above 
examples, i.e. that the reason people do not get in is that there is not enough public work available, and 
not that they are reluctant to work, and chose his absurd response: he selects participants randomly. 
 
The ombudsman’s report and the present research results have focussed attention to one other 
important issue. The arrangement of the 30-day public work is an important indicator of how 
the local government relates to the local benefit recipients, but that does not mean in itself that 
the community pursues a poor-friendly policy. 
 
In short, we could see that local governments’ attitude to public work varies a great deal. For 
small communities is it characteristic that the person of the mayor will be of crucial importance in 
terms of the type of local social policy to be implemented. A part of local governments  tend to 
interpret and use the public work program in their own community as an “opportunity”, 
while others as a “compulsion”. Where the “compulsion” interpretation prevails, even 
punitive measures are considered, while in villages where it is seen as an “opportunity”, they 
display a more accepting attitude toward unemployed and poor persons, and a more 
equitable arrangement of public work is typical. 
 
2.2. The assistance policy of local governments  
 
In what follows we are going to investigate what social measures local governments introduced, 
and how they apply them. To what extent they respond to poor people’s needs, what measures 
they apply to mitigate poverty within they narrow space of manoeuvre, and how much one 
notices, here, too, the need to discipline, and ‘punish’ poor people. 
 
The temporary allowance is a form of benefit that the local government allocates on a 
discretionary basis deciding who receives how much, and on what basis. Most local governments 
have very tight resources to allocate benefits, thus it is an on-going problem to select who should 
receive it. The situation is definitely frustrating, while at the same time it is not necessary for 
some local governments to experience constantly that the needy abuse the situation by applying 
for allowance despite not being eligible. That is because most local governments use the 
following arguments concerning allowances. 
 
Interest free loans are also a tool that the community may use to handle the problems of their 
poor. With reference to the above, namely that the needy try to abuse the allowance, the truth is 
that most local governments do not take advantage of that possibility, and revoked their 
regulations concerning interest free loans even if they ever had any. 
 
As already referred to above under the heading of public work, there are local governments that 
use the interest free loan as punishment, saying that only regular allowance recipients may 
receive it, which, in turn, depends on whether they participate in public work. The underlying 
assumption is that not working means not wanting to work, and those not wanting to work are 
not eligible to credit. Those not doing public work receive double punishment: a) they do not 
receive the higher pay (wages for their work), and b) they are deleted from the eligible list for 
interest free credit. 
 
Differences in attitude among local governments are well reflected by the following examples. 
Local governments M, and L, and N apply diametrically opposite strategies, specifically in 
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conjunction with the winter firewood. In community M the body of representatives enabled in a 
decree that the housing maintenance can be provided in kind, specifically as firewood, and 
community L also grants temporary allowance for firewood, while community N does not 
expressly encourage using the temporary assistance for firewood. They quote the principle 
referred to above, namely that their budget does not enable them to help everybody. 
 
Local governments may, in accordance with the amended Social Act, require that keeping one’s 
yard tidy should be an eligibility criterion for allowances. Here, too, mutually contrary 
approaches may be observed. Some local governments do take this very seriously, i.e. they 
passed legislation, and they enforce it, while others see it as a ridiculous, moreover, 
discriminative measure.  
 
 
Summary 
 
In accordance with the factors of organising public work presented above, local governments are 
seen to apply the following strategies:  
- socially sensitive,  
- subscribers to the work for allowances principle, and  
- those using public work as punishment. 
 
 Purpose of public work  Method of involvement Perception of illegal 
work 
Indicator of social 
sensitivity 
An option, use it as a quasi-
active labour market measure: 
R, C, D 
On a means-tested basis: R, M Ignores it: L, M 
Reflecting principle of 
work for allowances 
Only those should receive the 
allowance who work for it: N, 
That 
  
Using punitive 
measures  
Public work is a tool for both 
punishment and reward: B 
Screens to ensure that only 
one person per family apply 
(there is no budget for social 
sensitivity): N 
Finds inspection 
important: T 
 
Similar tendencies are observable in benefit policy: there are socially sensitive local governments, 
and those sharing the belief that it is impossible to help everyone, so they simply do not use the 
variety of tools that they could use, and punishing the poor also appears in local strategies.  
 
 Interest free loan Heating firewood ‘Tidy yard’ requirement 
Socially sensitive  Finds it important to 
provide it in some form: 
M, L 
Finds it discriminative: R 
There is no way of 
helping everyone  
Cancelled it on the basis 
that there would be too 
many recipients: S, T, 
Does not give because 
there is not enough to go 
round: N 
 
Punishment for the poor  Those not working are not 
eligible for credit: B 
 Takes it seriously: T 
 
Socially sensitive R, L, M, C, D 
Work for allowances, no budget to 
assist everyone  
N, T, S 
Punishing the poor B, N, T 
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It is important to highlight that our analysis did not aim either at capturing tendencies along the 
time axis, i.e. how the local conditions changed in the wake of new regulations, or at the 
assessment of the frequency of types. We have no way of saying which type is how typical, but 
we can say that there are two clearly distinct strategies applied by local governments. On 
the basis of their local policies regarding the poor, and the long-term unemployed, we distinguish 
1) socially sensitive ones, and 2) those subscribing to the principle of work for allowance / no 
budget to help everyone, and the latter to our experience do not shrink back from even 
punishing, and disciplining poor people. Local governments in the first type find it important to 
ensure that unemployed persons should find employment, and work, but recognise the fact that 
converting public work into forced labour (especially coupled with very low wages paid) 
discourages rather than motivates. 
 
The same is reflected in reports by unemployed people, which we analysed, and found that a 
great deal of distrust characterises communities even where the local government tries to 
display a socially sensitive attitude. We have explained this by the fact that if we take the results, 
and the various types of trust deriving from the equitable procedures, the results can only give 
rise to distrust as current policies (which local legislation can only partly counterbalance) are 
essentially anti-poor. That also points to the fact that where an atmosphere of confidence 
prevailed, a necessary ingredient for the good operation of a local community, even there it may 
be assumed that it was gradually weakening, and these communities are in a one-way street of 
disintegration. That holds true even if trust from procedural fairness is still present (even in 
villages where the local government belongs to type 2) but this, as we have seen, relates not to the 
procedural correctness of an institution, but to confidence in a particular person. 
 
So type 1) local governments find the current public work system a counter-incentive, and 
essentially ridiculous and discriminative with all the associated punitive procedures. With type 
2) local governments the “work for allowance” principle links up with the argument of “no 
budget to help all”. This latter has a legitimising role as it practically only uses the punitive 
tools among the available local governmental tools and ignores others (interest-free loan, 
temporary allowance, firewood, etc.). 
 
Our ultimate conclusion could be that despite even if there is nothing we can say concerning the 
prevalence of the different local governmental strategies, we can still state that in communities 
where they are receptive to the ideology of workfare they seize every opportunity to 
enforce it, while in places where there is no such receptivity, they try to exercise social 
sensitivity even at the cost of by-passing the law. At the same time the very strong central 
anti-poor policy may trigger the disintegration of local communities even where the local 
government is trying to implement an opposite strategy. 
